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Reconciling Different Views on Responsible Leadership: A Rationality-Based Approach 
 
ABSTRACT 
Business leaders are increasingly responsible for the societal and environmental impacts of their 
actions. Yet conceptual views on responsible leadership differ in their definitions and theoretical 
foundations. This study attempts to reconcile these diverse views and uncover the phenomenon 
from a business leader’s point of view. Based on rational egoism theory, this article proposes a 
formal mathematical model of responsible leadership that considers different types of incentives 
for stakeholder engagement. The analyses reveal that monetary and instrumental incentives are 
neither sufficient nor necessary for business leaders to consider societal and environmental 
stakeholder needs. Non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives, such as leaders’ values and 
authenticity, as well as their planning horizons, counterbalance pure monetary and instrumental 
orientations. The model in this article complements the growing body of research on responsible 
leadership by reconciling its various conceptual views and providing a foundation for future 










Business leaders are increasingly accountable for the stakeholders outside their immediate 
economic spheres, and their responsibilities extend to their companies’ societal and 
environmental influences (Wade, 2006). According to Carroll and Shabana (2010), these new 
responsibilities are part of discretionary and ethical domains and represent the broader social 
contract between society and business. Although business leaders usually have certain degrees of 
discretion in their actions (Carroll, 1979; Crilly et al., 2008; Maak and Pless, 2006; Treviño et al., 
2008; Waldman and Galvin, 2008), their specific responsibilities are not always clearly defined 
and constantly prompt questions with regard to their legitimacy.  
Any business leader’s pursuit of responsible leadership includes considerable challenges, 
pressure, and complexities. In particular, the probable trade-offs between achieving profit 
maximization and undertaking societal or environmental responsibilities (Henriques and 
Richardson, 2012) illustrate the inherent difficulties of responsible leadership. An essential 
question these trade-offs imply has to do with whether responsible leadership can ever be truly 
responsible (Waldman and Siegel, 2008). On this issue there is a gap in the literature; nurtured by 
various normative, descriptive, and paradigmatic points of view (Pless and Maak, 2011), extant 
work is inconclusive in defining the extent and scope of responsible leadership. Waldman (2011) 
points out the caveats and dangers of these variations risking “confusion and even biases in the 
pursuit of an understanding of responsible leadership” (p. 77). We aim to address this gap by 
taking a business leader’s point of view and analyzing the various drivers of responsible 
leadership. With a foundation of rational egoism theory (Peikoff, 1991; Rand, 1964; Smith, 
2000), we assume that business leaders opt for strategies that optimally serve their individual 
objectives. We first review various theoretical and conceptual views on responsible leadership 
and identify two contrasting perspectives: agent and stakeholder views. Mirroring these 
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perspectives, we discuss various incentives for stakeholder engagement, which many understand 
as actions that aim to ‘do good’ (i.e., enhancing societal and environmental welfare for 
stakeholders) and ‘do no harm’ (i.e., avoiding harmful consequences for stakeholders other than 
shareholders) (e.g., Crilly et al., 2008; Miska et al., 2013; Stahl et al. , 2013). On this foundation, 
we propose a formal, rationality-based model of stakeholder engagement that uncovers the 
decision-making mechanisms of responsible leadership. This rational perspective aims to 
complement extant literature on responsible leadership by reconciling the various views on this 
increasingly important phenomenon, as well as to provide a foundation for further theory 
development and testing.  
RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP VIEWS 
Extant literature does not conclusively define the concept of responsible leadership. 
Scholars suggest different perspectives that arise from various normative, descriptive, and 
paradigmatic points of view (Pless and Maak, 2011). These points of view rest on long-standing 
debates and arguments regarding the responsibilities of business and the varied history of the 
concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Carroll, 1999). Waldman and Galvin (2008) 
remark that “responsible leadership is not the same concept in the minds of all” (p. 328). 
According to Pless and Maak (2011), the field is fluid, and “the tentative answer to the question 
“What is responsible leadership?” must be “It depends.”” (p. 5). Therefore, it is possible to 
classify literature on responsible leadership systematically alongside two interrelated dimensions: 
(1) the degree of stakeholder inclusion and (2) the scope of responsibility. The first dimension 
defines the degree to which notions of responsible leadership comprise different sets of 
stakeholders. The second dimension describes the bandwidth of diverse types of responsibilities. 
This distinction mirrors recent findings from an empirical study by Pless et al. (2012), who, based 
on interviews with 25 business leaders, found differences in these leaders’ responsible leadership 
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orientations. The orientations varied along with the breadth of the constituent groups on which 
they focused, and the degree of accountability toward stakeholders extended beyond shareholders 
and owners.  
By examining extant work alongside the two dimensions of stakeholder inclusion and 
scope of responsibility, we identify three comprehensive perspectives on responsible leadership: 
agent, stakeholder, and converging views. The key roles and loci of responsible leadership shift 
across the two dimensions. They extend from business leaders with agent roles with business 
owners and predominantly internal organizational loci to business leaders with multiple roles 
with diverse stakeholders and both internal and external loci. Figure 1 illustrates this continuum.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Agent Views  
According to agent theory, one or several persons (principals) assign decision-making 
power to one or several other persons (agents), who then act on their behalf (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). From an agent perspective, responsible leadership aligns with 
Friedman’s (Friedman, 1970, 2007; Friedman and Friedman, 2002) doctrine that “the social 
responsibility of business is to increase its profits” (Friedman, 2007, p. 173). Within the 
boundaries of societal rules embodied in law and ethical custom, business leaders’ primary 
responsibility is to safeguard economic returns. Waldman and Galvin (2008) suggest three key 
principles of such economic-based responsible leadership: Business leaders are solely responsible 
to shareholders, their behavior is strategic and calculable to benefit shareholders, and reward and 
monitoring systems ensure that they fulfill their economic responsibilities. Low degrees of 
diverse stakeholder inclusion consequently characterize agent views of responsible leadership 
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and focus on economic responsibilities. Various critics have found fault with Friedman’s 
thinking. One criticism is that his ideas are logically unsound and lack clarity (McAleer, 2003; 
Mulligan, 1986). Schaefer (2008) notes that Friedman’s economic-focused view exempts 
shareholders from exercising social responsibility. Nonetheless, Voegtlin et al. (2012) remark 
that literature on the enhanced responsibility of business leaders, beyond the narrow economic 
scope, is relatively rare.  
Stakeholder Views 
Hill and Jones (1992) propose stakeholder–agency theory, a combination of agency theory 
and stakeholder theory, to explain the characteristics of contractual relationships between a firm 
and its stakeholders. According to the theory, business leaders reconcile various stakeholders’ 
interests through their actions. Stakeholder–agency theory is conceptually aligned with more 
contemporary leadership theories. These extend beyond the classical leader–follower dyad within 
organizations and focus on how business leaders affect the various social systems in which they 
and their companies are embedded (Komives and Dugan, 2010). Parallel to this idea, stakeholder 
views on responsible leadership tend to consider broad stakeholder networks through an ethical 
lens. Maak and Pless’s (2006) understanding of responsible leadership as a “social-relational and 
ethical phenomenon, which occurs in social processes of interaction” (p. 99), is representative of 
the stakeholder view paradigm. It implies that business leaders attempt to contribute to 
sustainable societal and environmental developments by taking responsibility for pressing 
problems such as poverty and global warming. High degrees of diverse stakeholder inclusion 
consequently characterize stakeholder views of responsible leadership and encompass economic, 
societal, and environmental responsibilities. Critics tend to accuse them of having a Pollyannaish 
stance (Waldman and Galvin, 2008)—that is, an overly optimistic pursuit of responsibility at the 




These perspectives converge between the agent and stakeholder views we have already 
described. They represent attempts to reconcile business leaders’ economic with ethically driven 
societal and environmental responsibilities. Oftentimes, converging views on responsible 
leadership follow strategic considerations along the lines of “good ethics is good business” 
(Schwartz and Carroll, 2003, p. 516). For example, Porter and Kramer (2006) suggest that 
because business leaders are not responsible for all global problems, they should identify the 
issues their companies can resolve most effectively and from which they can earn the greatest 
competitive advantage. In addition, Waldman and Siegel’s (2008) argument about what should 
drive business leaders in the area of CSR converges between the economic perspective and the 
stakeholder view. They conclude that a combination of instrumental, calculative behavior and 
business leaders’ values and ethical motives is probably best for combining the two perspectives. 
Converging views on responsible leadership therefore vary in both their degrees of stakeholder 
inclusion and their scopes of responsibility. They attempt to reconcile the economic and 
stakeholder views but do so in various ways.  
Although agent, stakeholder, and converging views on responsible leadership display the 
characteristics and differences we have mentioned, they share two key commonalities. First, they 
assume that responsible leadership complies with legal regulations and law. Second, they assume 
that business leaders have discretionary choices in meeting their responsibilities (Carroll and 
Shabana, 2010). These are relatively restricted, as the agent views maintain, or considerably 
expanded, according to the stakeholder perspectives. Because business leaders’ discretionary 
choices within regulatory boundaries are so important, we next draw on literature about ethical 
decision making—on which we later build our analyses of the viability of responsible leadership 
from a business leader’s perspective.  
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DECISION-MAKING MECHANISMS AND THE THEORY OF RATIONAL EGOISM 
Sonenshein (2007) classifies several influential studies as ‘rationalist approaches’, 
because the underlying theories assume that decision makers cautiously evaluate evidence and 
apply moral principles in response to ethical issues (e.g., Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Jones, 1991; 
Treviño, 1986). Although Sonenshein finds these rationalist approaches popular and influential—
partly because of the absence of alternative explanations and theories—he points out their 
limitations. In particular, rationalist approaches tend to ignore uncertainty inherent in 
organizational settings and in people’s intuitive choices and judgment.  
Woiceshyn (2011) asserts that several researchers find rational and intuitive components 
to contribute relatively equally to people’s ethical decision making (Reynolds, 2006; Simon, 
1987). With a dual processing model, she argues that decision makers responding to ethical 
dilemmas spiral back and forth between rational and intuitive processing, but the underlying key 
process consists of integration by essentials. Based on interviews with CEOs, she finds that 
rational egoism is the moral code they apply when integrating conscious and subconscious 
processing and pursuing long-term success. The premise of rational egoism implies that 
maximizing one’s own good and self-interest is the primary aim in life, because “Only self-
preservation can be an ultimate goal, which serves no end beyond itself.” (Peikoff, 1991, p. 211). 
Although conflicting views exist (e.g., Bowie, 1991), rational egoism does not have a cynical 
intent, nor does it suggest that a person should realize whatever serves his or her self-interests. 
Rather, the virtue of rationality implies the “acceptance of reasons as one’s only source of 
knowledge, one’s only judge of values and one’s only guide to action” (Peikoff, 1991, p. 221). 
Rational egoism is thus compatible with a common sense view of ethics as guide for living and 
thriving without harming others (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994; Woiceshyn, 2011). Whereas 
rationality is the key virtue of rational egoism, several derivative virtues implicit in rationality 
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emerge from it: productiveness as creating value by adjustment of nature to humans; honesty as 
not faking facts in the pursuit of values; justice as assessing persons objectively and granting 
them what they deserve; independence as the main orientation to reality; integrity as being loyal 
to rational principles; and pride as achieving one’s own moral perfection (Peikoff, 1991; Rand, 
1964; Woiceshyn, 2011).  
The theory of rational egoism is compatible with the agent, stakeholder, and converging 
views on responsible leadership. Although these perspectives differ in their degrees of 
stakeholder inclusion and their scopes of responsibility, the theory’s emphasis on rationality as 
the primary decision-making guidepost is appropriate for all three to explain the viability of 
responsible leadership from a business leader’s point of view. In the common sense view of 
ethics, the theory is compatible with the ‘do good’ and ‘do no harm’ (Crilly et al., 2008; Miska et 
al., 2013; Stahl et al., 2013) dimensions of stakeholder engagement. It therefore provides an 
integrative framework applicable to the various views on responsible leadership. We thus discuss 
the foundations for applying the theory to responsible leadership.  
INCENTIVES FOR STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
The virtue of rationality involves recognizing and accepting reasons as the only 
foundation of knowledge and as the only guidance for judgments and actions (Peikoff, 1991). 
The different views on responsible leadership provide a variety of reasons for stakeholder 
engagement. Depending on the underlying perspective of responsible leadership and the implied 
degree of stakeholder inclusion and scopes of responsibility, business leaders may or may not 
consider these reasons relevant. We therefore label these reasons ‘incentives’, referring to their 
discretionary nature (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). Based on our literature review, we suggest two 
broad categories of such incentives: (1) monetary and instrumental incentives and (2) non-
monetary and non-instrumental incentives. Both categories mirror the two views at the ends of 
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the continuum we describe: agent views and stakeholder views. Although monetary and 
instrumental incentives for stakeholder engagement directly or indirectly contribute to a 
company’s economic returns, non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives correspond to the 
ethical foundations of the stakeholder views and, in addition to economic goals, target societal 
and environmental responsibilities. Because a full list of incentives is beyond the scope of this 
article, we limit ourselves to discussing a handful of illustrations to demonstrate the viability of 
the two-type categorization. 
Monetary and Instrumental Incentives 
The incentives for stakeholder engagement to directly or indirectly increase or maintain a 
company’s economic gains are distinctive in this category. Examples include strategic 
considerations, anticipated negative costs and sanctions in case of irresponsible leadership, and 
societal expectations. 
Strategic considerations. Several authors (e.g., Burke and Logsdon, 1996; Schaltegger 
and Wagner, 2006; Weber, 2008) identify the strategic benefits of CSR: Responsible leadership 
can benefit a company’s reputation positively, help attract and retain talent more easily, or justify 
premium prices for products (Waldman and Siegel, 2008). Although it is difficult for business 
leaders to assess the exact monetary value of their stakeholder engagement, this engagement 
might increase a company’s economic gains and incentivize related behavior. In this regard, 
Barnett (2007) remarks that even if not all socially responsible activities maximize profits, some 
will. Porter and Kramer (2006) systematically guide business leaders to pursue strategies that 
leverage the benefits of responsible leadership to their companies’ competitive advantage.  
Anticipated negative costs and sanctions. A plethora of evidence suggests that 
irresponsible leadership (i.e., business leaders who intentionally or unintentionally harm 
stakeholders) can result in negative effects for entire companies (e.g., Bansal and Candola, 2004; 
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Detert et al., 2007). The costs and consequences of such irresponsible leadership include 
alienated customers and suppliers, damaged corporate reputations, and a need for surveillance 
mechanisms (Cialdini  et al., 2004; Waldman & Galvin, 2008). Although such anticipated 
negative costs may not be tangible and are likely incalculable, the magnitude and consequences 
can be enormous. More generally, Devinney (2009) considers the principle of social sanctions to 
be a central concept of corporations’ socially responsible actions. Although it may be difficult for 
business leaders to specify the costs of irresponsible leadership, the possibility that societal 
sanctions could affect a company’s profits may incentivize stakeholder engagement. Campbell 
(2007), from an institutional perspective, claims that industry self-regulations are frequently a 
result of anticipating intervention by the state or else from governmental regulations that are 
insufficient to protect the industry from itself. Business leaders who anticipate stringent 
regulatory environments or increased involvement from the outside, and probably higher 
monetary burdens, likely perceive a need for stakeholder engagement. 
Societal expectations. General attitudes and resulting regulations are not the only ways in 
which society demands responsible leadership. Shareholders are increasingly concerned about the 
effects of leadership on companies’ economic conditions. A growing proportion of mainstream 
institutional investors, who are members of important ownership groups of listed companies in 
many developed economies, are adopting socially responsible investment practices (Sparkes and 
Cowton, 2004). Guay et al. (2004) assert that non-governmental organization (NGO) shareholder 
activism directly challenges corporate boards, because it can point out inadequate leadership 
actions. Such movements and societal activism therefore may lead to severe consequences for 
business leaders and their companies, which could incentivize stakeholder engagement.  
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Non-Monetary and Non-Instrumental Incentives 
Examples of this category represent incentives for stakeholder engagement that go beyond 
economic responsibilities and target societal and environmental goals. Such incentives have a 
strong ethical foundation and are directly linked to individual business leaders. Examples include 
business leaders’ values and authenticity, sense of care and duty to help, and personal corporate 
citizenship.  
Values and authenticity. Whetstone (2001) argues that business leaders might have 
several reasons for their actions, including personal values, such that “moral reasons can include 
… the belief that so acting is characteristic of the kind of person one wants to be” (p. 102). 
Leadership scholars frequently link leaders’ values to authenticity. Freeman and Auster (2011) 
propose that the concept of authenticity means acting on the basis of not only one’s perceived 
values but equally “one’s history, relationships with others, and aspirations” (p. 15). This 
extended idea of authenticity implies that past experiences, current values, and future aspirations 
shape business leaders. This idea further suggests that acting authentically involves reflecting on 
one’s past and values critically and adjusting behaviors according to future aspirations. For 
business leaders, such alterations may lead to reflections that contradict monetary and 
instrumental aspirations in favor of societal and environmental ones.  
Sense of care and duty of assistance. Maak and Pless (2009) describe a sense of care and 
duty of assistance as two important elements of responsible leadership. The first element refers to 
a sense of care for others’ basic needs. It builds on the concept of empathy for people within as 
well as outside of companies. The second element refers to the obligation to care for those in 
need and to create basic, reasonable conditions (Rawls, 2001). Both elements represent 




Personal corporate citizenship. Grit (2004) describes the concept of personal corporate 
citizenship, in which people rather than organizations and structures drive corporate citizenship. 
This citizenship appeals to attitudes and actions of business leaders instead of institutions that 
authoritatively provide moral guidelines. The ‘democratization’ of values involves business 
leaders continually developing their own moral frameworks and guidelines. Consequently, 
business leaders reach beyond their traditional roles and make choices to help improve society 
and the environment.  
Table 1 summarizes monetary and instrumental incentives and non-monetary and non-
instrumental incentives for stakeholder engagement. We analyze the relevance of these incentive 
types for business leaders and how they make stakeholder engagement reasonable from a leader’s 
perspective—that is, how incentives follow the principles of the theory of rational egoism. To 
this end, we propose a streamlined mathematical model and describe how the various incentives 
for stakeholder engagement affect business leaders’ decisions. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
A FORMAL MODEL OF RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP 
Mathematical models and economic-oriented analyses allow decision makers to 
incorporate logical considerations and rational deliberation. Although Hermalin (1998) observes 
that such approaches have not charted leadership research, scholars agree that formal analyses are 
useful at the firm level (e.g., Husted and de Jesus Salazar, 2006; Jones, 1995; McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001). We believe that such a formal, rationality-based analysis at the individual level is 
equally useful for two reasons. First, it allows incorporating business leaders’ deliberations and 
considerations in accordance with the theory of rational egoism. Second, it is capable of 
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reflecting how the two types of incentives for stakeholder engagement interact. We first describe 
a basic model of responsible leadership, which we then extend by including the two types of 
incentives for stakeholder engagement. We refine this model and incorporate considerations 
related to business leaders’ time and planning horizons.  
Basic Model of Responsible Leadership 
To derive the business leader’s objective function, we assume that it is possible to 
measure the extent to which a business leader considers stakeholder demands with a single 
variable S, which is presumed to be equal to or larger than zero,    . This variable S represents 
a business leader’s stakeholder engagement, and we interpret high values of S as an indicator of 
strong consideration for stakeholders. The assumption that a business leader’s stakeholder 
engagement is measureable with a single variable represents a simplification, because most 
companies interact with various stakeholders who may have competing interests. However, this 
study does not aim to investigate which stakeholders’ interests receive primary consideration; 
rather, we are interested in the conditions that are generally favorable for stakeholder 
engagement.  
A business leader’s stakeholder engagement S is not an independent variable because it 
(directly or indirectly) affects the company’s current and future profits. We account for this 
dependence by modeling the company’s present value of profits  as a function of the leader’s 
stakeholder engagement:       , which means that a company’s profits are related to a 
business leader’s stakeholder engagement. With respect to this relationship, it is possible to 
distinguish two cases: If profits increase with stakeholder engagement, profit maximization and 
stakeholder engagement align perfectly. Mathematically, this case may be identified by 
examining the slope – or the first derivative – of the profit function, which will then be positive: 
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       . Under such conditions, a marginal increase in stakeholder engagement is profitable. A 
practical example of this condition is Better World Books, a triple-bottom-line company that 
aims to harness the value of books and fund literacy initiatives around the world (Better World 
Books, 2013). This business model helps the company differentiate and survive in the highly 
competitive industry of online booksellers. Thus, Better World Books’ triple-bottom-line 
approach implies that stakeholder engagement complements economic objectives. Alternatively, 
there may be a trade-off between profit maximization and societal and environmental 
engagement, such that a marginal increase in stakeholder engagement comes at the expense of 
profits. Formally, this means that the respective profit function has a negative slope,        . 
In such a case, it appears – at least at first glance – unlikely that a business leader will realize 
stakeholder engagement, because doing so would lead to economic losses. For example, Shell’s 
leaders have not taken into consideration either the local Ogoni people or the environmental 
impacts when the company started operating in the Niger Delta (Boele et al., 2001). Shell 
probably ignored societal and environmental concerns in favor of profits.  
Extended Model 
Because of such potential divergences between profit maximization and societal and 
environmental stakeholder engagement, we need to extend our model and include the two types 
of incentives for stakeholder engagement: monetary/instrumental and non-monetary/non-
instrumental incentives. We assume monetary and instrumental incentives to be proportional to 
the company’s profit function,     . In contrast, non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives 
are independent of potential economic effects. Business leaders likely weight the two types of 
incentives for stakeholder engagement differently—which responsible leadership theory reflects. 
Thus, we assume that we can express the relative strength of non-monetary and non-instrumental 
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incentives with a parameter α, grounded in the business leader’s individual, person-related, and 
ethical considerations. In the simplest case, we may therefore model the business leader’s overall 
objective function (    ) as follows: 
                     (1) 
If the business leader’s decisions are affected only by monetary and instrumental 
considerations, then    . Then, the business leader’s sole aim is to maximize profits, u(S) = 
    . In contrast, a business leader who is also driven by non-monetary and non-instrumental 
incentives can be modeled by assuming that    , such that not only the company’s profits but 
also the company’s stakeholder engagement are considered. A prominent example of the latter 
kind of leader is The Body Shop founder Anita Roddick, who decided to dump the principles of 
shareholder value and adopt a business model of social responsibility (Pless, 2007). In her view, 
“The business of business should not be about money, it should be about responsibility. It should 
be about public good, not private greed.” (Roddick, 2000, p. 3). 
The business leader’s objective function in Equation (1) allows us to derive a condition 
for the emergence of stakeholder engagement. When we calculate the first derivative of the 
business leader's objective function to identify its maximum, we find that a business leader opts 
for positive stakeholder engagement (   ) if  
       
  
   
. (2) 
In this equation, the term        denotes the marginal change in profits if stakeholder engagement 
increases starting from zero,    . When stakeholder engagement implies a trade-off with 
profits, and thus         , the inequality in Equation (2) gives an upper bound for the profit 
loss that a business leader is willing to accept to demonstrate positive stakeholder engagement. 
Based on this model, we derive four propositions: 
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i) Purely profit-maximizing business leaders will care about a good relationship with the 
company’s stakeholders only if stakeholder engagement is a means to increase profits.  
If a business leader is driven purely by monetary and instrumental incentives—which the 
agent view of responsible leadership implies—the strength of non-monetary and non-
instrumental incentives ( ) and, therefore the right-hand side of Equation (2), equals zero. 
Thus, the condition in Equation (2) is fulfilled only if        , implying that stakeholder 
engagement must positively correlate with the company’s profits. Nestlé Group’s chair and 
former CEO Peter Brabeck-Letmathe provides an example of such a profit-maximizing 
perspective. In an interview, he expressed concerns about altruistic giving: “I’m personally 
very much against corporate philanthropy. You shouldn’t do good with money which doesn’t 
belong to you.” (Mulier and Bogner, 2010). 
ii) When business leaders are also driven by non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives, 
they consider stakeholders’ interests even if profits are at stake.  
If a business leader is swayed by non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives, which 
formally means that  
 
> 0, there might be positive stakeholder engagement even if the 
consequences for the company’s profits are negative,        . However, in this case the 
negative effects on the company’s profits must not exceed the business leader’s personal 
limit, because meeting the condition in Equation (2) is essential. 
iii) The higher the trade-off between stakeholder engagement driven by non-monetary and non-
instrumental incentives and the company’s economic performance, the more unlikely it will 
be for business leaders to opt for positive stakeholder engagement.  
If positive stakeholder engagement leads to drastic economic losses (meaning that        is 
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strongly negative), then Equation (2) is more difficult to satisfy, and the business leader likely 
ignores stakeholders’ interests.  
iv) In contrast, business leaders motivated mostly by non-monetary and non-instrumental 
incentives are willing to make substantial economic sacrifices to maximize their objective 
functions.  
As Equation (2) shows, the more non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives sway a 
business leader (that is, the higher the leader’s  ), the more willing this business leader will 
be to accept potential negative economic consequences. This situation is particularly clear in 
the case of small companies whose owners, obeying social norms, accept considerably lower 
payments from their acquaintances. In extreme cases, such practices even may result in the 
bankruptcy of the company. 
Refined Model  
In the extended model, we relied on a simplification of the business leader’s monetary and 
instrumental incentives, such that they were proportional to the present value of the company’s 
profits. However, because the present value of the company’s future profits is typically unknown, 
it is more realistic to suppose that the business leader’s monetary and instrumental incentives are 
highly correlated with current profits, whereas future profits play a minor role for the business 
leader’s objective function. We therefore refine the extended model and split the present value of 
the company’s profits (    ) into two parts:       denotes the current profit, and       denotes 
the present value of the future profits. That is, we write the present value of profits as a sum of 
current profits and future profits:                  . Moreover, we introduce a parameter δ 
that indicates the business leader’s planning horizon; a value of δ close to zero represents a 
business leader with a short planning horizon, whereas a value of δ close to one implies that a 
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leader is interested in the long-term effect of his or her actions on profits. For both cases, we may 
modify the business leader’s objective function in Equation 1 as follows: 
                            . (3) 
According to this refined objective function, the business leader still aims to keep a 
balance between monetary and instrumental and between non-monetary and non-instrumental 
incentives. However, the leader’s monetary and instrumental incentives might be linked more to 
current profits, a case which can be modeled by considering a leader with a short planning 
horizon, such that    . In most applications, it seems plausible to assume that the immediate 
profit consequences of stakeholder engagement are negative,         , whereas stakeholder 
engagement might hold positive returns in the future,:         . Under the modified objective 
function, the sufficient condition for the emergence of stakeholder engagement becomes: 
          
 
     
  
   
. (4) 
Equation (4) thus states that the business leader demonstrates positive stakeholder engagement if 
the economic consequences, as evaluated by the business leader (         
 
    ), do not fall 
below the threshold 
  
   
. This condition allows us to extend our previous conclusions, as follows: 
v) Business leaders with a short-term planning horizon and without non-monetary and non-
instrumental incentives for stakeholder engagement show no stakeholder engagement at all. 
A leader with a short-term planning horizon (   ) who is swayed only by monetary and 
instrumental incentives (i.e., the strength of non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives α 
is 0) will only consider the immediate profit consequences of stakeholder engagement, which 
are likely to be negative:         . Thus, the condition in Equation (4) cannot be met. This 
situation holds true even if stakeholder engagement is beneficial for shareholders—that is, 
even if stakeholder engagement leads to higher long-term profits:         
 
      . In 
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such a case, it may be in the shareholders’ interest to extend the business leader’s monetary 
and instrumental incentives for stakeholder engagement, for example, by adjusting the 
business leader’s compensation structures. Supporting this conclusion, Mahoney and Thorn 
(2006) observe that contingent compensations—such as stock options or bonuses—are 
essential factors in business leaders’ compensation structures to stimulate corporations’ 
responsible behaviors.  
vi) In general, business leaders will show the more stakeholder engagement, the more they are 
interested in the long-run development of the company. 
The longer the business leader’s planning horizon δ, the more likely it becomes that future 
benefits of stakeholder engagement will compensate for immediate profit losses. More than a 
century ago, Werner von Siemens, the founder of Siemens which today has become a 
multinational electronics and engineering conglomerate, provided an exemplary statement 
reflecting this long-term consideration. He maintained that his company accomplish 
responsibilities to employees, society, and the environment: “I won’t sell the future of my 
company for a short-term profit.” (Siemens, 2013). 
vii)  Business leaders who own the company they direct are more likely to demonstrate 
stakeholder engagement. 
All other things being equal, business leaders who own the company they direct are more 
likely to take on a long-term perspective than are non-owning leaders. That is, such business 
leaders will have a longer planning horizon δ and naturally demonstrate stakeholder 
engagement. Furthermore, the reputation of a business leader who owns the company is often 
closely related to company reputation. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of these analyses. It displays stakeholder engagement as a 
function of the business leader’s planning horizon and incentives. As the overview indicates, 
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stakeholder engagement may be above or below the profit-maximizing level. In general, the 
longer the business leader’s planning horizon, and the more non-monetary and non-instrumental 
incentives apply, the more stakeholder engagement business leaders demonstrate. It is important 
to note that though these conclusions derive from a mathematical model, using differential 
calculus, we do not presume that business leaders actively perform all these calculations. Instead, 
as evolutionary game theory suggests, learning and decision processes can result in rational 
behaviors even in the absence of calculative reasoning (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1998).  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
MODEL LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Although our analyses yielded several conclusions about conditions under which 
responsible leadership based on the two types of incentives for stakeholder engagement may be 
reasonable from a business leader’s perspective, we offer some caveats. First, the theory of 
rational egoism provides a foundation to reconcile the various views of responsible leadership. 
However, the assumptions implied by the virtue of rationality do not account for the cases of 
leadership action in which irrational or intuitive considerations are ultimately decisive. Despite 
empirical evidence that suggests that the virtue of rationality is applied by business leaders in 
their pursuit of success (Woiceshyn, 2011), this idea opens up questions about situations and 
contexts in which business leaders are not guided by rationality principles or in which contextual 
influences may dominate business leaders’ decision making. Further research on responsible 
leadership may find valuable opportunities to investigate these questions.  
The role of context and its influence on responsible leadership point to the second 
limitation. The broad categorizations into monetary and instrumental, as well as non-monetary 
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and non-instrumental, incentives for stakeholder engagement are useful to model business 
leaders’ rational considerations systematically, in light of the different conceptual views on 
responsible leadership. However, the simplifications inherent in this classification neither account 
for the entire complexity incorporated in leadership action, which generally goes beyond the 
single person and extends to some form of followership, nor represent the full context 
dependency usually incorporated in ethical reasoning processes. For example, most rationalist 
approaches to ethical decision making, as Sonenshein (2007) reviews, assume that situational or 
contextual factors influence people’s reasoning. Several of these influences, such as cultural 
factors, are not necessarily classifiable according to the two types of incentives for stakeholder 
engagement. Finally, our portrayal of a single person conducting business is reductionist, because 
teams usually direct businesses. Although team decision making is likely more complex, we 
expect that it is possible to apply the foundations of our model to the team context and to multiple 
decision makers. Further research might even benefit from adopting a mathematical, formal 
methodology to investigate such team-related factors. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
We aim to contribute to extant research on responsible leadership by explaining 
stakeholder engagement characterized by ‘do good’ and ‘do no harm’ (e.g., Crilly et al., 2008; 
Miska et al., 2013; Stahl et al., 2013) leadership actions. Based on the differentiation between 
monetary and instrumental incentives that target economic gains and non-monetary and non-
instrumental incentives that direct societal and environmental ends, we analyze how these two 
types become relevant from a business leader’s point of view. Our mathematical model of 
responsible leadership provides various examples based on rational considerations and explains 
several of the underlying decision-making mechanisms. We can describe the many facets of 
responsible leadership in a nuanced way and in view of its various theoretical and conceptual 
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views. We intend to show that it is possible to reconcile these facets and that future theory 
development may benefit by going beyond the classical stakeholder–stockholder dichotomy. This 
observation might be important especially in view of current economic developments, 
globalization, and increased business interconnectedness. The phenomenon of responsible 
leadership is becoming increasingly complex and spans economies in various stages of 
development, different institutional environments, and diverse cultures. Arguably, the 
phenomenon as such is unlikely to reflect a clear understanding of its normative foundations, and 
rational egoism theory to some degree provides such a basis for our analyses. Yet given the 
growing complexity of the phenomenon and multiple contexts in which it is becoming relevant, 
approaches such as inductive normative methods (Margolis and Walsh, 2003), as recently applied 
by Pless et al. (2012), may be more constructive than singular imperative stances. A more lucid 
understanding of business leaders’ views on responsible leadership and their underlying 
rationales could enrich research in the field. In this respect, our analyses represent a first 
approach to systematically mapping several of the various avenues that business leaders might 
follow. 
The specific findings of our analyses provide several implications. We show that a 
positive relationship between stakeholder engagement and future profits is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for business leaders, in view of stakeholder engagement. It is not necessary because 
business leaders’ non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives, such as their values and 
authenticity, sense of care and duty to help, or personal corporate citizenship, may compensate 
for negative economic consequences, provided these consequences do not exceed certain 
individual monetary boundaries. A positive impact of stakeholder engagement on future profits is 
also insufficient for business leaders to demonstrate stakeholder engagement. This situation 
occurs because leaders may have a shorter-term planning horizon than their companies’ 
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shareholders, in which case the business leaders would not anticipate (or internalize) future 
monetary benefits of responsible leadership. As a consequence, it paradoxically may be in the 
shareholders’ or business owners’ interest to provide additional monetary incentives to shift 
business leaders’ interests toward long-term perspectives. This implication to some degree 
appears to contradict both the agent views on responsible leadership, which emphasize business 
owners’ profit maximization principles, and the stakeholder views, which appeal to the personal, 
ethical qualities of business leaders. 
From a policy perspective, our analyses have several implications: If endogenous 
incentives for business leaders to take all stakeholders into account are too low—such as when 
business leaders have short-term planning horizons—it may be in the public authority’s (and the 
neglected stakeholders’) interest to establish additional incentives. These exogenous stimuli 
could range from legal regulations (e.g., laws, prescriptions) to economic rewards (e.g., subsidies, 
grants) and might also include threats of sanctions (e.g., calls to boycott). Such regulations, 
though, could limit business leaders’ room to maneuver and affect those with longer-term 
planning horizons, as the process of reconciling monetary and instrumental, as well as non-
monetary and non-instrumental, incentives gets restricted from the outside. Consequently, 
limiting business leaders’ discretionary choices from the outside is likely to result in reduced 
opportunities for them to actively engage in ‘do good’ and ‘do no harm’ behaviors.  
Because we have found that a positive effect of stakeholder engagement on a company’s 
profits is neither necessary nor sufficient for business leaders’ stakeholder engagement, the 
question arises about whether assessing managerial performance should still rely mostly on 
monetary measures. Several studies dispute this notion. For example, Székely and Knirsch (2005) 
suggest that measuring the extent to which corporate performance increases in response to 
implementation of CSR initiatives may be a way to strengthen linkages between financial and 
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CSR performance, a link that turns out to be ambiguous but that receives empirical verification 
(e.g., Cochran and Wood, 1984; Godfrey et al., 2009; Schreck, 2011). The converging views of 
responsible leadership, and particularly those that build on ‘doing well by doing good’, are in line 
with this notion. In other words, our analyses imply that leadership performance should 
increasingly be assessed beyond pure monetary measures and instead be complemented with 
assessments that mirror the extended responsibilities of business leaders.  
Finally, our findings show that responsible leadership does not necessarily incorporate 
straightforward trade-offs between economic performance and societal and environmental 
targets, as the agent views may suggest. This corresponds to similar notions in the literature such 
as Freeman et al.’s (2007) observation that “a business that constantly trades off the interests of 
one group for another is doomed for trouble and failure” (p. 10).  Similarly, Kolstad (2007) 
argues that there are times when corporations should stray from profit maximization to pursue 
goals important to society and ultimately themselves. It is these varying instances that make 
responsible leadership an ambiguous concept that is difficult to grasp, and they also trigger the 
various conceptual views of the phenomenon. Our rationality-based approach represents one 
attempt to systematically delineate several of these instances to provide a lucid and nuanced 




S business leader’s stakeholder engagement 
 present value of the company’s profits 
α relative strength of non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives 
      company’s current profits 
      present value of the company’s future profits 








Bansal, P. & Candola, S. (2004). Corporate social responsibility: Why good people behave badly 
in organizations. Ivey Business Journal 67(4), 1-5. 
Barnett, M. L. (2007). Stakeholder influence capacity and the variability of financial returns to 
corporate social responsibility. The Academy of Management Review 32(3), 794-816. 
Better World Books. (2011). Triple bottom line: Social enterprise. Retrieved June 4, 2013, from 
http://www.betterworldbooks.com/info.aspx?f=bottomlines 
Boele, R., Fabig, H. & Wheeler, D. (2001). Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni. A study in 
unsustainable development: I. The story of Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni people –
environment, economy, relationships: Conflict and prospects for resolution. Sustainable 
Development 9(2), 74–86. 
Bowie, N. E. (1991). Challenging the egoistic paradigm. Business Ethics Quarterly 1(1), 1-21. 
Burke, L., & Logsdon, J. M. (1996). How corporate social responsibility pays off. Long Range 
Planning, 29(4), 495–502.  
Campbell, J. L. (2007). Why would corporations behave in socially responsible ways? An 
institutional theory of corporate social responsibility. The Academy of Management 
Review 32(3), 946-967. 
Carroll, A. B. (1979). A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate performance. The 
Academy of Management Review 4(4), 497-505. 
Carroll, A. B. (1999). Corporate social responsibility evolution of a definitional construct. 
Business & Society 38(3), 268-295. 
Carroll, A. B. & Shabana, K. M. (2010). The business case for corporate social responsibility: A 




Cialdini, R. B., Petrova, P. K. & Goldstein, N. J. (2004). The hidden costs of organizational 
dishonesty. MIT Sloan Management Review 45(3), 67-73. 
Cochran, P. L. & Wood, R. A. (1984). Corporate social responsibility and financial performance. 
The Academy of Management Journal 27(1), 42-56. 
Crilly, D., Schneider, S. C. & Zollo, M. (2008). Psychological antecedents to socially responsible 
behavior. European Management Review 5(3), 175-190. 
Detert, J. R., Treviño, L. K., Burris, E. R. & Andiappan, M. (2007). Managerial modes of 
influence and counterproductivity in organizations: A longitudinal business-unit-level 
investigation. Journal of Applied Psychology 92(4), 993-1005. 
Devinney, T. M. (2009). Is the socially responsible corporation a myth? The good, the bad, and 
the ugly of corporate social responsibility. The Academy of Management Perspectives 
23(2), 44-56. 
Donaldson, T. & Dunfee, T. W. (1994). Toward a unified conception of business ethics: 
Integrative social contracts theory. The Academy of Management Review 19(2), 252-284. 
Freeman, R. E. & Auster, E. R. (2011). Values, Authenticity, and Responsible Leadership. 
Journal of Business Ethics 98(1), 15-23. 
Freeman, R. E., Harrison, J. S., & Wicks, A. C. (2007). Managing for stakeholders: Survival, 
reputation, and success. Yale University Press. 
Friedman, M. (1970). A Friedman doctrine: The social responsibility of business is to increase its 
profits. New York Times Magazine 13 September (1970), 33, 126. 
Friedman, M. (2007). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. In W. C. 
Zimmerli, K. Richter & M. Holzinger (Eds.), Corporate ethics and corporate governance 
(pp. 173-178). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.  
RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP 
29 
Friedman, M. & Friedman, R. D. (2002). Capitalism and freedom. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, Ill. 
Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D. K. (1998). The theory of learning in games (vol. 2). The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
Godfrey, P. C., Merrill, C. B. & Hansen, J. M. (2009). The relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and shareholder value: An empirical test of the risk management 
hypothesis. Strategic Management Journal 30(4), 425-445. 
Grit, K. (2004). Corporate citizenship: How to strengthen the social responsibility of managers? 
Journal of Business Ethics 53(1-2), 97-106. 
Guay, T., Doh, J. P. & Sinclair, G. (2004). Non-governmental organizations, shareholder 
activism, and socially responsible investments: Ethical, strategic, and governance 
implications. Journal of Business Ethics 52(1), 125-139. 
Henriques, A. & Richardson, J. (2012). The triple bottom line: Does it all add up. Earthscan, 
London. 
Hermalin, B. E. (1998). Toward an economic theory of leadership: Leading by example. 
American Economic Review 88(5), 1188-1206. 
Hill, C. W. & Jones, T. M. (1992). Stakeholder-agency theory. Journal of Management Studies 
29(2), 131-154. 
Hunt, S. D. & Vitell, S. (1986). A general theory of marketing ethics. Journal of Macromarketing 
6(1), 5-16. 
Husted, B. W. & de Jesus Salazar, J. (2006). Taking Friedman seriously: Maximizing profits and 
social performance. Journal of Management Studies 43(1), 75-91. 
Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4), 305-360. 
RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP 
30 
Jones, T. M. (1991). Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: An issue-
contingent model. The Academy of Management Review 16(2), 366-395. 
Jones, T. M. (1995). Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and economics. The 
Academy of Management Review 20(2), 404-437. 
Kolstad, I. (2007). Why firms should not always maximize profits. Journal of Business Ethics 
76(2), 137-145.  
Komives, S. R. & Dugan, J. P. (2010). Contemporary leadership theories. In R. A. Couto (Ed.), 
Political and civic leadership: A reference handbook (vol. 1) (pp.111-120). SAGE 
Publications, Los Angeles, CA. 
Maak, T. & Pless, N. M. (2006). Responsible leadership in a stakeholder society – a relational 
perspective. Journal of Business Ethics 66(1), 99-115. 
Maak, T. & Pless, N. M. (2009). Business leaders as citizens of the world. Advancing humanism 
on a global scale. Journal of Business Ethics 88(3), 537-550.  
Mahoney, L. S. & Thorn, L. (2006). An examination of the structure of executive compensation 
and corporate social responsibility: A Canadian investigation. Journal of Business Ethics 
69(2), 149-162. 
Margolis, J. D. & Walsh, J. P. (2003). Misery loves companies: Rethinking social initiatives by 
business. Administrative Science Quarterly 48(2), 268-305. 
McAleer, S. (2003). Friedman’s stockholder theory of corporate moral responsibility. Teaching 
Business Ethics 7(4), 437-451. 
McWilliams, A. & Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the firm 
perspective. The Academy of Management Review 26(1), 117-127.  
RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP 
31 
Miska, C., Stahl, G. K. & Mendenhall, M. E. (2013). Intercultural competencies as antecedents of 
responsible global leadership. European Journal of International Management 7(5), 550-
569. 
Mulier, T. & Bogner, J. (2010). Nestle chairman opposes company philanthropy as misuse of 
funds. Retrieved July 3, 2013, from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2065101&sid=ap1jJty7qodY 
Mulligan, T. (1986). A critique of Milton Friedman’s essay “the social responsibility of business 
is to increase its profits”. Journal of Business Ethics 5(4), 265-269. 
Peikoff, L. (1991). Objectivism: the philosophy of Ayn Rand. Penguin Books (Dutton), New 
York, NY. 
Pless, N. M. (2007). Understanding responsible leadership: Role identity and motivational 
drivers. Journal of Business Ethics 74(4), 437-456. 
Pless, N. M. & Maak, T. (2011). Responsible leadership: Pathways to the future. Journal of 
Business Ethics 98(1), 3-13. 
Pless, N. M., Maak, T. & Waldman, D. A. (2012). Different approaches toward doing the right 
thing: Mapping the responsibility orientations of leaders. The Academy of Management 
Perspectives 26(4), 51-65. 
Porter, M. E. & Kramer, M. R. (2006). Strategy & society: The link between competitive 
advantage and corporate social responsibility. Harvard Business Review 84(12), 78-92. 
Rand, A. (1964). The virtue of selfishness: A new concept of egoism. Signet/New American 
Library, New York, NY. 
Rawls, J. (2001). The law of peoples: With, the idea of public reason revisited. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP 
32 
Reynolds, S. J. (2006). A neurocognitive model of the ethical decision-making process: 
Implications for study and practice. Journal of Applied Psychology 91(4), 737-748. 
Roddick, A. (2000). Business as unusual. HarperCollins Publishers, London. 
Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of agency: The principal’s problem. The American 
Economic Review 63(2), 134-139. 
Schaefer, B. P. (2008). Shareholders and social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics 81(2), 
297-312. 
Schaltegger, S. & Wagner, M. (2006). Managing and measuring the business case for 
sustainability. Capturing the relationship between sustainability performance, business 
competitiveness and economic performance. In S. Schaltegger & M. Wagner (Eds.), 
Managing the business case for sustainability (pp. 1-28). Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield. 
Schreck, P. (2011). Reviewing the business case for corporate social responsibility: New 
evidence and analysis. Journal of Business Ethics 103(2), 167-188. 
Schwartz, M. S. & Carroll, A. B. (2003). Corporate social responsibility: A three-domain 
approach. Business Ethics Quarterly 13(4), 503-530. 
Siemens. (2013). Siemens annual report. Sustainability – our guiding principle. Retrieved 
September 18, 2013, from http://www.siemens.com/annual/10/foundation/sustainability-
our-guiding-principle.html 
Simon, H. A. (1987). Making management decisions: The role of intuition and emotion. The 
Academy of Management Executive 1(1), 57-64. 
Smith, T. (2000). Viable values: A study of life as the root and reward of morality. Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Oxford. 
RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP 
33 
Sonenshein, S. (2007). The role of construction, intuition, and justification in responding to 
ethical issues at work: The sensemaking-intuition model. The Academy of Management 
Review 32(4), 1022-1040. 
Sparkes, R. & Cowton, C. J. (2004). The maturing of socially responsible investment: A review 
of the developing link with corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics 
52(1), 45-57. 
Stahl, G. K., Pless, N. M. & Maak, T. (2013). Responsible global leadership. In M. E. 
Mendenhall, J. S. Osland, A. Bird, G. R. Oddou, M. L. Maznevski, M. J. Stevens & G. K. 
Stahl (Eds.), Global leadership: Research, practice, and development (2nd ed), (pp. 240-
259). Routledge, New York, NY. 
Székely, F. & Knirsch, M. (2005). Responsible leadership and corporate social responsibility: 
Metrics for sustainable performance. European Management Journal 23(6), 628-647. 
Treviño, L. K. (1986). Ethical decision making in organizations: A person-situation interactionist 
model. The Academy of Management Review 11(3), 601-617. 
Treviño, L. K, Weaver, G. R. and Brown, M. E. (2008). It’s lovely at the top: Hierarchical levels, 
identities, and perceptions of organizational ethics. Business Ethics Quarterly 18(2), 233-
252. 
Voegtlin, C., Patzer, M. & Scherer, A. G. (2012). Responsible leadership in global business: A 
new approach to leadership and its multi-level outcomes. Journal of Business Ethics 
105(1), 1-16. 
Wade, M. (2006). Developing leaders for sustainable business. In T. Maak & N. M. Pless (Eds.), 
Responsible leadership (pp. 227-244). Routledge, London. 
Waldman, D. A. (2011). Moving forward with the concept of responsible leadership: Three 
caveats to guide theory and research. Journal of Business Ethics, 98(1), 75-83 
RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP 
34 
Waldman, D. A. & Galvin, B. M. (2008). Alternative perspectives of responsible leadership. 
Organizational Dynamics 37(4), 327-341. 
Waldman, D. A. & Siegel, D. (2008). Defining the socially responsible leader. The Leadership 
Quarterly 19(1), 117-131. 
Weber, M. (2008). The business case for corporate social responsibility: A company-level 
measurement approach for CSR. European Management Journal 26(4), 247-261. 
Whetstone, J. T. (2001). How virtue fits within business ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 33(2), 
101-114. 
Woiceshyn, J. (2011). A model for ethical decision making in business: Reasoning, intuition, and 



















high degree/broad scope 
low degree/narrow scope 










Leader’s role: multiple roles according to various stakeholders 
Locus: within and outside a company 
Representative work: Maak and Pless (2006, 2009), Stahl et al. (2013) 
Leader’s role: reconciling economic, societal, and environmental responsibilities 
Locus: within and outside a company 
Representative work: Porter and Kramer (2006), Waldman and Galvin (2008), 
Waldman and Siegel (2008) 
Leader’s role: agent of business owners 
Locus: within company 














Incentives for stakeholder 
engagement with the purpose of 
directly or indirectly increasing or 
maintaining a company’s 
economic gains 
Incentives for stakeholder 
engagement that go beyond 
economic responsibilities and 
target societal and environmental 
goals 
Examples 
 Strategic considerations 
 Anticipated negative costs 
and sanctions in case of 
irresponsible leadership 
 Societal expectations 
 
 People’s values and 
authenticity 
 Sense of care and duty of 
assistance 
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